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The Contract State, Program Failure, and 
Congressional Intent: The Case of the 
Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program 
Alan White* 
If a future administration were to adopt sweeping student loan forgiveness, the contract 
state may stand in the way of actual debt cancellation. In the likely event that Congress were 
to adopt something short of universal and immediate student loan forgiveness, the Public 
Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) experience teaches us that the federal bureaucracy is 
unlikely to deliver fully on the legislative promise. In the first two years of the PSLF program, 
nearly 100,000 student loan borrowers have applied, and the Department of Education’s 
contractor has denied roughly 99,000 of those applications. The Department blames Congress 
for an unduly complex program design and borrowers for applying without understanding the 
eligibility rules. Given that PSLF has only four basic eligibility tests and that applicants are 
college graduates who can presumably read and count, this narrative seems implausible to 
explain a ninety-nine percent denial rate. Evidence from oversight agency reports, state 
attorney general and class action lawsuits, and thousands of borrower complaints logged by 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau tell a different story—a story of agency failure to 
implement and oversee the program, and of widespread contractor errors and 
misrepresentations. This Article explores the PSLF failure in detail, as an exemplar of the 
dysfunction of the contract state. I describe the legislative goals motivating student loan 
forgiveness and the contract architecture of the state-servicer relationship that administers a 
multibillion-dollar government loan repayment and cancellation program. I then evaluate the 
political and legal accountability for failure, and the promise and perils of the contract state. 
  
 
* Professor of Law, City University of New York Law School. This Article is based on a white paper 
coauthored with research assistant Talia Curtis. 
First to Printer_White_SNCE Edits.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/27/20  9:52 AM 
256 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:255 
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 256
I.  Competing Goals of the Title IV Student Loan Program .......................... 257
II.  History of the USED Direct Loan Servicing Contracts ............................. 259
A. Contracting Out—Advocates and Critics ............................................. 259
B. USED Student Loan Administration—From Reinsurer to 
Servicing Contract Overseer ................................................................... 261
C. Servicing Contract Incentives and Outcomes—No Rewards for 
Borrower Relief ......................................................................................... 262
III.  The Public Service Loan Forgiveness Failure ............................................... 263
A. Education Department Rejects Nearly All PSLF Applications ........ 263
B. Reasons for PSLF Denials ...................................................................... 265
C. Qualifying Payments ................................................................................ 267
1. The “On-Time” Payment Issue ...................................................... 268
2. The Employer Certification Issue ................................................... 269
3. Administrative Forbearance, Servicing Transfers, and Lost 
Payments ............................................................................................. 271
4. Ineligible Payment Plans (Subject of the TEPSLF Fix) .............. 273
5. Waiting Too Long to Consolidate FFEL into Direct Loans ...... 273
D. Denials Based on Missing Information ................................................. 275
E. Denials Based on No Eligible Loans ..................................................... 276
F. Denials Based on Employment Dates .................................................. 276
G. Denials Based on Ineligible Employer .................................................. 277
IV.  Failure of the Contract State to Reconcile Public Goals ............................ 278
V.  Lessons and Recommendations ...................................................................... 280
A. Contract Oversight and Enforcement ................................................... 281
B. Contract Design ........................................................................................ 283
C. Regulatory Fixes ........................................................................................ 284
1. Qualifying Payments ......................................................................... 284
2. Eligible Employers ............................................................................ 285
D. Legislative Fixes ........................................................................................ 285
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 286 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The explosion of student loan debt in the United States1 resulted from fifty 
years of shifting congressional policy choices and has prompted calls for wholesale 
 
1. Total student loan debt stood at $1.5 trillion by September 30, 2019. CTR. FOR 
MICROECONOMIC DATA, QUARTERLY REPORT ON HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND CREDIT (2019), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/interactives/householdcredit/data/pdf/HHDC_2019 
Q3.pdf [https://perma.cc/T54S-ZBRV]. Seriously delinquent and defaulted loans stood at 10.9% of 
the total. Id. 
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debt cancellation.2 As federal student loan programs evolved, Congress adopted a 
variety of loan discharge and cancellation programs, including the 2007 Public 
Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) Program.3 The catastrophic experience with PSLF 
has brought to the fore the contradictions plaguing the Education Department and 
its contracting out of student loan administration. In this Article, I briefly review 
the history and competing goals of the Higher Education Act’s student loan 
programs, how the programs came to be operated by a privatized agency-contractor 
model, how and why the PSLF program has failed, how that failure reflects deep 
failures of the contract state, and what lessons can be learned. 
I. COMPETING GOALS OF THE TITLE IV STUDENT LOAN PROGRAM 
As federal student loans evolved from a minor supplement to the primary 
funder for college,4 Congress incrementally charged the U.S. Department of 
Education (USED)5 not only with conventional loan administration and collection 
goals, but also with administering a variety of borrower relief programs, including 
income-dependent payment options and a variety of forgiveness and discharge 
programs targeted to various vulnerable or deserving borrowers.6  
The original vision of the 1965 Higher Education Act (HEA) was to 
consolidate federal funding for students and institutions and to achieve equal 
educational opportunity through a system of grants for low-income students and 
inexpensive loans for the middle class.7 The HEA created a federally guaranteed 
privately funded student loan program.8 Banks made loans, state nonprofit agencies 
provided guarantees to the lenders, and the federal government reinsured the state 
guarantee agencies, in what is now known as the Federal Family Education Loan 
(FFEL) Program.9 Some defaulted loans ended up being held by USED, which used 
private collection agencies to enforce them, largely through administrative wage 
garnishments and tax refund intercepts.10 In the early period, USED’s role, apart 
 
2. E.g., Emily Cochrane, Bernie Sanders Unveils Education Plan to Eliminate Student Loan Debt, 
N.Y. TIMES ( June 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/24/us/politics/bernie-sanders-
student-debt.html [https://perma.cc/2ZLV-FAMZ]. 
3. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m) (2007). 
4. See Luke Herrine, The Law and Political Economy of a Student Debt Jubilee, 68  
BUFF. L. REV. 281, 289–92 (2020) (citing Lawrence E. Gladieux, Federal Student Aid Policy: A History 
and Assessment, in FINANCING POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION: THE FEDERAL ROLE (1995), https://
www2.ed.gov/offices/OPE/PPI/FinPostSecEd/gladieux.html [https://perma.cc/W29R-57E3]). 
5. The U.S. Department of Education (USED) was created as a separate cabinet-level agency 
in 1980. Prior to 1980 the Office of Education within the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW) administered federal education programs.  
6. See, e.g., Total and Permanent Disability Discharge, 34 C.F.R. § 685.213 (2020);  
Income-Contingent Repayment Plans, 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a) (2017). 
7. Susan B. Hannah, The Higher Education Act of 1992: Skills, Constraints, and the Politics of 
Higher Education, 67 J. HIGHER EDUC. 498, 503–06 (1996). 
8. Herrine, supra note 4, at 289–92. 
9. Id. 
10. See Colleen Campbell, Getting Private Collection Agencies Out of Federal Student Loans,  
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ( Jan. 24, 2018, 9:18 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
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from institutional gatekeeping, i.e. determining which colleges and universities could 
participate, was to oversee state nonprofit loan guarantee agencies and act as  
a reinsurer.11  
By the end of the 1980s, loan volume was rapidly outpacing federal grants.12 
Congressional Democrats sought in the 1992 reauthorization to restore the vision 
of redistribution through student aid by strengthening grants to needy students.13 
However, the legislative process, the crosscurrents of interest group, agency, and 
staff influence, and the growing dominance of antideficit ideology led to a major 
shift from grants to loans, converting higher education from a publicly funded social 
good to a privately financed consumer product.14 The 1992 Act’s increase in loan 
limits and introduction of the Federal Direct Loan program signaled the evolution 
of USED into a giant loan collection bureau. At the same time, however, the 1992 
reauthorization introduced income-based repayment plans15 and added new loan 
discharges for borrowers victimized by closed or fraudulent for-profit trade 
schools.16 In other words, the 1992 legislation charged the Department with not 
only loan collection and loan default reduction goals, but also with debt reduction 
and relief goals for congressionally favored borrowers. 
Introduced as a pilot program in the 1992 Higher Education Reauthorization 
Act,17 Federal Direct Loans were made from the U.S. Department of the Treasury 
(Treasury) funds, disbursed to universities, and repaid to the Treasury via private 
servicing contractors. From 1992 to 2008, Congress prevented Direct Loans from 
fully displacing federally guaranteed FFEL loans, which were quite profitable for 
banks. As a result of the 2008 financial crisis, banks suddenly faced serious liquidity 
problems and were unable to continue funding student loans.18 The federal 
government stepped in and purchased FFEL loans in a lesser-known aspect of the 
 
education-postsecondary/news/2018/01/24/445284/getting-private-collection-agencies-federal-
student-loans/ [https://perma.cc/H5ZK-ZNCT]; If You Default on Your Federal Student Loan, the 
Loan May Be Placed with a Collection Agency, Which Will Then Contact You to Obtain Payment,  
FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.gov/manage-loans/default/collections [https://perma.cc/
C5U2-DSPQ] ( last visited Aug. 8, 2020). 
11. See Eric M. Fink & Roland Zullo, Federal Student Loan Servicing: Contract Problems and 
Public Solutions 4 (June 25, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2459090 
[https://perma.cc/644Z-PVUW]. 
12. Hannah, supra note 7, at 498–99. 
13. Id. at 507. 
14. Id. at 524. 
15. Pub. L. No. 102-325, § 429, 106 Stat. 448 (1992). 
16. Id. § 428. 
17. Id. § 451; Herrine, supra note 4, at 294 n.61. 
18. Feds Take Over Student Loan Program from Banks, SFGATE (June 25, 2012, 7:01 AM), 
https://www.sfgate.com/business/networth/article/Feds-take-over-student-loan-program-from-
banks-3193888.php [https://perma.cc/6Q2B-JUA8]. 
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financial bailout.19 In 2010, the Obama administration ended the FFEL program,20 
in part because of the private market funding problem and in part because Direct 
Loans had consistently proven less costly to the Treasury than the subsidized FFEL 
loans. The share of new student loan originations went from eighty percent FFEL 
to 100% Direct Loans in the space of two to three years, requiring a massive shift 
in loan servicing arrangements and leading to the present-day model with a public 
agency overseeing massive contracts with private loan servicers.21 
II. HISTORY OF THE USED DIRECT LOAN SERVICING CONTRACTS 
A. Contracting Out—Advocates and Critics 
At least since the 1960s, the federal government has relied on private 
contractors as well as public agencies to deliver a range of social services.22 A widely 
influential 1992 book by David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing  
Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector, accelerated 
the push for privatization of public services.23 Gaebler and Osborne called for 
government agencies to measure outcomes rather than inputs, embrace 
competition, privatize and contract out services, and focus on strategy and goals 
rather than processes.24 Vice President Al Gore adopted the “reinventing 
government” mantra and advocated many of the Gaebler/Osborne 
recommendations, including more privatization and contracting out.25 The 
profound influence of Reinventing Government is evident in USED’s approach to 
administering the student loan programs, relying as it has on private contractors to 
service its expanding loan portfolio.  
As a theoretical matter, neoclassical economists argue that competition among 
private contractors should result in more efficient and lower-cost delivery of 
services than public agency employees.26 On the other hand, economists have also 
pointed out that contracting out results in more transaction and agency costs, 
 
19. Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans Act (ECASLA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-227, 
122 Stat. 740. 
20. Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act (SAFRA) of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-152,  
§§ 2201–2213, 124 Stat. 1071 (2010). 
21. See Fink & Zullo, supra note 11, at 4. 
22. David M. Van Slyke, The Mythology of Privatization in Contracting for Social Services, 63  
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 296, 309 n.1 (2003). 
23. DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE 
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1992). 
24. Id. 
25. AL GORE, NAT’L PERFORMANCE REV., COMMON SENSE GOVERNMENT: WORKS 
BETTER AND COSTS LESS 12 (1998) (touting the reduction in federal government employment  
by 160,000). 
26. E.g., E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 122 (2000). 
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particularly when the government agency needs to intervene to modify the public 
services being offered27: 
Sources of potentially high costs associated with contracting out include 
asymmetric information, the management and supervision of contracts, 
“non-contractible” elements related to service delivery (such as in the case 
of confidence goods), contractual incompleteness and limited availability 
of competitive suppliers in the market (citations omitted). Following from 
this, it has also been argued that even if government contracting has 
positive effects over the short term, the potential cost savings from 
outsourcing may diminish or disappear over time by rising prices of the 
private sector companies due to the so-called “hold-up” problem (citations 
omitted). When contracts are highly complex or incomplete, governments 
may need to renegotiate the contract in the case of an unforeseen problem 
or event. This not only has costs, it also gives the private firm – with its 
incentives to maximize profits – the opportunity to raise the prices it 
charges to governments (citation omitted). If goods or services are 
contracted out over the long-term, governments may irrevocably lose their 
capabilities as provider, increasing the bargaining power of the  
private provider(s).28 
Empirical studies have shown that contracting out public services, including 
education, may cost more because of the need for agency contract design and 
monitoring.29 The New Public Management of the 1980s, embracing privatization 
and efficiency, drew increasing criticism from advocates of the New Public Service, 
who argued that equity and democratic participation should remain key objectives 
for government agencies and that program outcomes to be measured should not be 
left to agency bureaucrats but should engage citizen participation in their 
formulation.30 Among other criticisms, the New Public Service advocates point out 
that New Public Management reduces citizens to customers and prizes efficiency 
above other values,31 a criticism that is germane to USED’s contracting approach 
for handling its trillion-dollar portfolio of student loans. 
 
27. See David E. M. Sappington & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Privatization, Information and Incentives, 6 
J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 567 (1987). 
28. José M. Alonso, Judith Clifton & Daniel Días-Fuentes, The Impact of Government Outsourcing 
on Public Spending: Evidence from European Union Countries, 39 J. POL’Y MODELING 333,  
336–37 (2017). 
29. Eunju Rho, Contracting Revisited: Determinants and Consequences of Contracting Out for 
Public Education Services, 73 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 327 (2013). 
30. Janet V. Denhart & Robert B. Denhart, The New Public Service Revisited, 75  
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 664 (2015). 
31. Id. at 668–69. 
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B. USED Student Loan Administration—From Reinsurer to Servicing  
Contract Overseer 
Eric Fink and Roland Zullo describe the evolution of USED’s public-private 
contracting structure for administering student loans in an excellent paper.32 The 
Education Department had used a single servicing contractor, ACS Education 
Solutions, LLC, to service the relatively small Federal Direct Loan portfolio prior 
to 2008.33 To deal with the shift to 100% Federal Direct Loans, USED contracted 
with four of the largest players in the FFEL Program (Pennsylvania Higher 
Education Assistance Agency (PHEAA), Great Lakes Educational Loan Services, 
Sallie Mae/Navient, and NelNet Loan Servicing) known as the TIVAS, or Title IV 
additional servicers, and also with nonprofit servicers that previously serviced 
FFEL loans.34 PHEAA was the Pennsylvania state FFEL guarantor and also runs 
various state-funded financial aid programs.35 It services Direct Loans through a 
subsidiary known as FedLoan.36 Navient is the renamed Sallie Mae, once the largest 
secondary market purchaser of FFEL loans.37 From 2010 to 2013, Congress 
required USED to award servicing contracts to several grandfathered nonprofit 
servicers and to pay them higher fees than the “TIVAS,” to the tune of $3.1 billion. 
This subsidy was eliminated in the 2014 budget.38 
The private contractors dominate the contracting partnership that administers 
the huge federal student loan program. Fink and Zullo estimate that the annual total 
paid to federal loan servicers in 2013 was just over a billion dollars, while USED 
spent an estimated $9.5 million on salaries of agency contract monitoring staff.39 
While the contractor payments dwarf the agency oversight budget, the combined 
servicing cost nevertheless represents less than one-tenth of one percent of the 
federal loan portfolio, which surpassed the trillion-dollar mark in 2013.40 USED 
separately contracted with debt collection firms to handle loans that have gone into 
default.41 The 2018 collection firm contracts with two collectors are estimated to 
be worth $400 million.42 A relatively small bureaucracy overseeing an oligopoly of 
 
 32. Fink & Zullo, supra note 11. 
33. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., AMENDMENT OF SOLICITATION/MODIFICATION OF 
CONTRACT (2005), https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/leg/foia/acscontract1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6WZ9-3RZQ]. 
34. Id. at 5. 
35. See generally Abou t  PHEAA , PHEAA, https://www.pheaa.org/about [https:// 
perma.cc/5DHX-4D3L] ( last visited Apr. 24, 2020). 
36. See id. 
37. Fink & Zullo, supra note 11, at 5. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Student Loan Debt by Age Group, FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y. (Mar. 29, 2013), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/studentloandebt/index.html [https://perma.cc/V4RV-JNZC]. 
41. Fink & Zullo, supra note 11, at 4. 
42. Andrew Kreighbaum, Debt-Collection Contracts Awarded to 2 Companies, INSIDE HIGHER 
ED ( Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2018/01/15/debt-collection-
contracts-awarded-2-companies [https://perma.cc/59KY-RJBU]. 
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large nonprofit servicers has thus come to be charged with implementing federal 
policy goals for student loans.  
C. Servicing Contract Incentives and Outcomes—No Rewards for Borrower Relief 
USED pays student loan servicers a small fixed monthly fee for each student 
loan.43 The monthly fee is highest for loans in current payment status and is reduced 
progressively for loans in increasing stages of delinquency.44 The servicing contracts 
provide two incentives for servicers to keep borrowers current in payments (or in 
deferment or forbearance).45 In addition to the sliding scale of monthly fees, the 
contracts reallocate loan volume among servicers each year based on a set of 
performance measures. The performance measures include the following: 
1. Defaulted Loan Volume. Measured as a percentage of the servicer’s 
portfolio; 
2. Defaulted Borrowers. Measured as a percentage of all borrowers in the 
servicer’s portfolio; 
3. Borrower Satisfaction. Measured by surveys of borrowers; 
4. School Satisfaction. Measured by surveys of post-secondary schools; 
5. FSA (Federal Student Aid office within USED) Satisfaction. Measured 
by surveys of FSA personnel.46 
Fink and Zullo contend that these two sets of contractual incentives align 
poorly with the goals of the student loan program.47 Neither the meager dollars 
gained by converting a delinquent loan to current nor the possible increase in future 
loan volume approach the significant cost of even a thirty-minute staff conversation 
with a delinquent borrower.48 As a result, the servicers’ profit-maximizing strategy 
is simply to minimize expenses by reducing and underpaying customer service staff. 
Fink and Zullo conclude with a variety of recommendations, including a proposal 
to establish a public servicer to compete with the private agencies, located perhaps 
in the Treasury Department, IRS, or U.S. Postal Service.49  
The only additional payment USED makes to its contractor to evaluate 
borrower applications for PSLF is a one-time, five-dollar payment when PHEAA/
FedLoan first approves an Employer Certification Form (ECF) submitted by the 
borrower.50 PSLF is a loan benefit that requires the servicer to monitor payments 
over ten or more years, as well as to review employer certification paperwork and 
 




47. Id. at 9–10. 
48. Id.  
49. Id. at 13. 
50. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ED-FSA-09-D-0014, PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN  
FORGIVENESS—SINGLE SERVICER CONTRACT, TASK ORDER 0005 (2011) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC., SINGLE SERVICER CONTRACT ] (on file with author). 
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to evaluate the complete (or incomplete) borrower application at the end of the ten-
year period.51 Such an obviously insufficient payment reflects an agency culture and 
decision-making where cost minimization predominates over other borrower relief 
goals of the student loan program. 
III. THE PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN FORGIVENESS FAILURE 
A. Education Department Rejects Nearly All PSLF Applications 
Public Service Loan Forgiveness was adopted by a bipartisan majority in 
Congress and was signed into law by President Bush in 2007.52 PSLF was originally 
conceived as a niche benefit with little or no significant budgetary cost.53 As the 
program and higher education financing have evolved, PSLF could serve in the 
future to cancel student loan debt for the one in five borrowers who work for public 
and nonprofit employers, enabling them to buy houses and cars, start small 
businesses, and otherwise reenter and massively stimulate the economy. To date, 
more than 1.1 million borrowers in repayment have submitted approved public 
service employer certifications.54  
In the first two years that borrowers began applying for loan forgiveness, 
fewer than one percent (845 out of 90,962) were approved.55 Education Secretary 
Betsy DeVos and the Republican administration had no love for the program, 
proposing in each annual budget to eliminate it,56 but the failure to implement the 
law resulted from a perfect storm of misaligned contract incentives, agency and 
contractor indifference and neglect, poor contract oversight, and cumbersome 
agency regulations, in addition to flaws in the original legislative design.  
Congress created the PSLF Program as part of the College Cost Reduction 
and Access Act of 2007 in order to forgive eligible public servants’ loans after 120 
on-time qualifying payments.57 To qualify for PSLF, borrowers must (1) have Direct 
Loans, or consolidate Federal Family Education Loans into Direct Loans, (2) be 
 
51. See 20 U.S.C. §1087e(m). 
52. Pub. L. No. 110-84, § 401, 121 Stat. 784 (2007). 
53. Because borrowers would need to be in Federal Direct loans to qualify, cost estimates 
assumed borrowers in FFEL loans would consolidate into Direct Loans, thus increasing Direct Loan 
share of the portfolio. Federal Direct loans have lower net cost to the Treasury than FFEL loans. In 
2009, the Obama administration eliminated new FFEL loans and made all federal loans Direct Loans. 
54. See FED. STUDENT AID OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FEBRUARY 2020 PSLF  
REPORT: PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN FORGIVENESS (PSLF) PROGRAM DATA (Feb. 29, 2020), https://
studentaid.gov/data-center/student/loan-forgiveness/pslf-data [https://perma.cc/5X5M-5RFH]. 
55. FED. STUDENT AID OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., JUNE 2019 PSLF REPORT: PUBLIC 
SERVICE LOAN FORGIVENESS (PSLF) PROGRAM DATA ¶¶ 8, 16 (2019) [hereinafter JUNE DATA 
REPORT ], https://studentaid.gov/data-center/student/loan-forgiveness/pslf-data [https://
perma.cc/5X5M-5RFH]. 
56. Katie Lobosco, DeVos Wants to Cut Budget Funding for Student Loan Forgiveness, Again, 
CNN (Mar. 13, 2019, 3:33 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/13/politics/betsy-devos-student-
loan-forgiveness-budget/index.html [https://perma.cc/2J25-7YJT]. 
57. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m). 
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employed full-time by a qualifying public service employer or employers, (3) make 
120 on-time qualifying payments (4) on a qualifying repayment plan, and (5) 
complete the PSLF Application for Forgiveness.58 In other words, borrowers must 
have the right loans, the right employer, and be in the right repayment plans, all 
while making 120 on-time payments. Eligible borrowers could have begun making 
qualifying payments as of October 1, 2007.59 October 1, 2017 was the earliest 
borrowers could theoretically apply for PSLF. The U.S. Department of Education 
(USED) contracted with the PHEAA and its servicing arm FedLoan to administer 
all student loan accounts of borrowers applying for PSLF and to evaluate  
PSLF applications.60 
Since borrowers have been eligible to apply for forgiveness, the rate of 
successful applications has been shockingly low. Federal Student Aid (FSA), the 
office of USED responsible for administering federal student loans, issues quarterly 
PSLF Program Data reports.61 In the release covering the period through June 30, 
2019, FSA reported that 90,962 unique borrowers had submitted PSLF applications, 
covering 110,729 loans.62 Of those loans, 102,051 were processed and 1,216 
(representing 845 unique borrowers) were approved for discharge by the loan 
servicer.63 The successful applications accounted for barely one percent of 
processed PSLF applications.64 A spate of news outlets reported stories of 
borrowers who believed they qualified for PSLF loan discharge yet were being 
rejected at an alarming rate.65 Several state attorneys general and borrower class 
action representatives sued PHEAA, alleging systematic misrepresentations and 
malfeasance in its administration of PSLF.66 Many of the rejected applicants report 
 
58. See id.; Qualifying for PSLF, Section in Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF),  
FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.gov/manage-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/public-service# 
qualifying-for-pslf [https://perma.cc/R2JF-ZFKW] ( last visited May 22, 2020). 
59. Qualifying Payments, Section in Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF), FED. STUDENT AID, 
https://studentaid.gov/manage-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/public-service#qualifying-for-pslf 
[https://perma.cc/R2JF-ZFKW] ( last visited Aug. 23, 2020). 
60. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-547, PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN 
FORGIVENESS: EDUCATION NEEDS TO PROVIDE BETTER INFORMATION FOR THE SERVICER AND 
BORROWERS 1 n.2 (2018). 
61. See, e.g., JUNE DATA REPORT, supra note 55. 
62. Id. ¶¶ 8–9. 
63. Id. ¶¶ 11–12. 
64. See id. 
65. See Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Education Department Rejects Nearly All Applications for a 
Student Loan Forgiveness Program, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2019, 2:50 PM), https://www.latimes.com/
business/la-fi-student-loan-forgiveness-education-department-betsy-devos-20190403-story.html 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200824234817/https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-student-
loan-forgiveness-education-department-betsy-devos-20190403-story.html ]; Cory Turner, Why Public 
Service Loan Forgiveness Is So Unforgiving, NPR (Oct. 17, 2018, 9:27 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/
10/17/653853227/the-student-loan-whistleblower [https://perma.cc/WEG3-B5GU]; Jillian Berman, 
This Government Loan Forgiveness Program Has Rejected 99% of Borrowers So Far, MARKETWATCH 
(Sept. 23, 2018, 8:55 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/this-government-loan-forgiveness-
program-has-rejected-99-of-borrowers-so-far-2018-09-20 [https://perma.cc/WX4S-7R9L]. 
66. See infra notes 71–72.  
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being told by their student loan servicers that they were meeting all the requirements 
and on track to having their loans forgiven.67 As a matter of simple logic, it seems 
unlikely that tens of thousands of former college students, representing ninety-nine 
percent of applicants, would knowingly apply for a program whose eligibility rules 
they do not meet. Federal agency reports, media narratives, and litigation documents 
reveal the reasons for the PSLF failures and recommend oversight, contractual, 
regulatory, and legislative fixes. 
B. Reasons for PSLF Denials 
Although borrowers are denied PSLF based on all four criteria (wrong loan, 
wrong payment plan, wrong employer, and not enough payments) the evidence so 
far suggests that most of the problem results from a combination of servicing 
failures, USED’s unduly rigid rules for counting payments, and flaws in the process 
to certify employment. Some of the blame may also be attributed to design flaws in 
the legislation. To identify the causes of PSLF denials, I draw on USED’s skimpy 
data reports, the Inspector General,68 CFPB69 and GAO70 reports, state attorney 
general suits,71 borrower class actions,72 and borrower surveys and narratives.  
USED provides limited information in its data report on the reasons so many 
PSLF applications were denied.73 The report divides denials into five  
categories: [insufficient] Qualifying Payments (53%), Missing Information (25%), 
No Eligible Loans (16%), Employment Dates (2%), and Employer Not Eligible 
(2%).74 These report categories do not align with the four eligibility criteria because 
“Qualifying Payments” conflates three criteria: 120 on-time payments, payments 
made while working full-time for a qualifying public service employer, and payments 
made under the eligible repayment plans (right plan, right employer, and on-time 
payments). Moreover, the “No Eligible Loans” category appears to include only 
borrowers who have no Direct Loans at the end of ten years when they apply. 
 
67. See infra notes 88–89. 
68. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ED-OIG/A05Q0008, FEDERAL 
STUDENT AID: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO MITIGATE THE RISK OF SERVICER 
NONCOMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS FOR SERVICING FEDERALLY HELD STUDENT LOANS 
(2019) [hereinafter OIG REPORT ]. 
69. U.S. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, STAYING ON TRACK WHILE GIVING BACK, THE 
COST OF STUDENT LOAN SERVICING BREAKDOWNS FOR PEOPLE SERVING THEIR COMMUNITIES 
(2017) [hereinafter CFPB REPORT ], https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/research-
reports/staying-track-while-giving-back-cost-student-loan-servicing-breakdowns-people-serving-their-
communities/ [https://perma.cc/KNB6-AWVZ]. 
70. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 60. 
71. See Illinois v. Navient Corp., No. 2017CH00761 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Jan. 18, 2017); California  
v. Navient Corp., No. CGC-18-567732 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 16, 2018); Washington v. Navient Corp., 
No. 17-2-01115-1 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 2017); Pennsylvania v. Navient Corp., 354  
F. Supp. 3d 529 (M.D. Pa. 2018). 
72. See Transfer Order, In re FedLoan Student Loan Servicing Litig., 340 F. Supp. 3d 1377 
(J.P.M.L. 2018) (MDL No. 2833). 
73. See, e.g., JUNE DATA REPORT, supra note 55.  
74. Id. 
First to Printer_White_SNCE Edits.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/27/20  9:52 AM 
266 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:255 
Borrowers who started with ineligible loans, but consolidated into eligible Direct 
Loans during the 120 months, and did not realize the pre-consolidation payments 
don’t count are likely included in the “[insufficient] Qualifying Payments” category.  
Denials based on “Missing Information” are not broken down by category as 
to which information the borrower did not provide.75 However, it seems likely that 
most missing information would concern the borrower’s employers during the  
ten-year period, because servicers ought to have all necessary information to 
establish the other three criteria (right loan, right plan, and 120 on-time payments). 
Congress attempted to fix the PSLF in 2018 by focusing on only one of these 
issues, namely, borrowers whose payments didn’t qualify because they were in the 
wrong payment plan. The Temporary Expanded Public Service Loan Forgiveness 
(TEPSLF) Program relaxed one of the four PSLF requirements that borrowers 
made their payments under a qualifying income-based repayment plan.76 Some 
borrowers doing qualifying public service work and making on-time payments for 
ten years did not qualify for PSLF because for some of the ten years they were on 
graduated or extended repayment plans instead of standard or income-based 
repayment.77 TEPSLF applicants must have applied for PSLF and have been 
rejected, and meet the other three eligibility tests.78 TEPSLF essentially allows 
payments made under the wrong plan to retroactively count. The borrower must 
still have qualifying Direct Loans, must have had their public service employment 
certified annually for all ten years, and must have made payments under the 
otherwise nonqualifying payment plans on time, i.e. within fifteen days of the  
due date.79  
The TEPSLF fix has not worked. As of April 2019, 38,460 borrowers applied 
for TEPSLF, but only 262 applicants have successfully had their loans discharged.80 
Congress authorized $700 million for the program, but so far, only $10.6 million 
has been forgiven.81  
USED reported the following reasons for TEPSLF application denials: (1) 
borrower has not been in repayment for ten years (35%); (2) the borrower does not 
meet the TEPSLF payment requirements for payments during the last twelve 
 
75. Id. 
76. Pub. L. No. 115-141, § 315, 132 Stat. 348 (2018). 
77. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 19-595, PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN  
FORGIVENESS: IMPROVING THE TEMPORARY EXPANDED PROCESS COULD HELP REDUCE 
BORROWER CONFUSION 5–6 (2019). 
78. See id. 
79. Id. 
80. Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Education Department Rejects Vast Majority of Applicants for 
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months (20%); and (3) the borrower has no loans eligible to be discharged under 
the TEPSLF (15%).82  
Most denials are for not making enough qualifying payments. This could result 
from difficulties in certifying full-time qualifying employment, as well as simply not 
having made on-time payments, or other servicing problems with payment tracking, 
discussed in detail below. 
C. Qualifying Payments 
The USED servicer denied fifty-five percent of PSLF applications on the 
grounds that the applicant had made an insufficient number of qualifying 
payments.83 The data report defines this reason for rejection as follows: 
The borrower submitted a completed application and was reviewed to 
determine if the payments made qualify based on [three of] the criteria for 
the program (on-time, in full, on a qualifying repayment plan, while 
working at a qualifying employer). The results show the borrower has not 
made 120 qualifying payments. The borrower is informed they do not 
qualify because they have not yet made enough qualifying payments. The 
borrower is instructed to continue making qualifying payments and to 
resubmit the forgiveness application once 120 payments have been made.84  
Superficially, it may seem that borrowers are simply jumping the gun, applying 
before they have been in repayment for ten years. However, this category also 
includes borrowers who have paid for ten years, but whose payments are not all 
counted as qualifying.  
Borrowers who have not made 120 qualifying payments comprise at least 
five distinct problems identified by the CFPB, USED Inspector General, GAO, 
and borrower complaints, discussed in detail below: 
1) Payments made may not be counted because they were made too early 
or too late, i.e. not within fifteen days of the due date.  
2) Payments may not be counted because the servicer could not match an 
otherwise qualifying payment (right amount, right loan, or right plan) with 
an employment certification form (ECF). Payment matching may fail 
because the borrower’s employer did not qualify as public service during 
some months, the start and end dates on the ECF did not match the 
payment date(s), the ECF was rejected as not properly filled out, the ECF 
reflects less than full-time employment, i.e. fewer than thirty hours/week, 
or the borrower is unable to obtain an employer certification covering 
some months. 
3) Payments may not be counted because of various servicer errors, 
including placing accounts in administrative forbearance when recertifying 
 
82. JUNE DATA REPORT, supra note 55, ¶ 21. 
83. Id. ¶ 15. 
84. Id. ¶ 25 (“Definitions” tab of the spreadsheet). 
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income-based payments, payments misrecorded due to servicing transfers, 
or because of other errors.  
4) Payments made under a nonqualifying repayment plan or during 
forbearance or deferment do not qualify. 
5) The borrower incorrectly believed that payments made prior to 
consolidating FFEL or Perkins loans into Direct Loans counted, therefore 
applied before making 120 payments after consolidating.  
1. The “On-Time” Payment Issue 
To qualify as on time, a payment must be made within fifteen days of the due 
date.85 USED apparently interprets this to mean that a payment made either after 
the fifteenth of the month or before the fifteenth of the prior month is not a 
qualifying payment, even if the borrower has paid 120 total payments when they 
apply.86 There are a variety of reasons a borrower might pay early, or late.  
“Borrowers who received third-party loan repayment assistance [such as 
employer repayment assistance] complain that when their monthly benefit is more 
than their monthly payment the servicer may advance their monthly payments,” 
which can render future payments as nonqualifying, because early payments, like 
late payments, do not count as on time.87 Alternatively, borrowers may not receive 
subsidies to help make payments promptly enough to submit the payments within 
fifteen days after the due date. A borrower could have made total payments 
aggregating more than the required 120 payments but have some payments 
disqualified because of the timing issue. As one borrower reported in a  
CFPB complaint:  
I consolidated my loans in XXXX of 2009 to become eligible for the public 
service loan forgiveness [(PSLF)] program. . . . Despite documentation 
from XXXX that my loans were consolidated as income contingent in 
XXXX 2009, . . . I continued to argue for income contingent between 
XXXX and XXXX 2009, and documentation supporting that my payment 
should have been {$0.00} and qualified for PSLF, the current servicer 
XXXX has taken over a year to review my appeal. I have provided 
supplementary material twice and requested to see the documents provided 
by XXXX demonstrating I requested a forbearance when it would not be 
in my best interest and I have proof to the contrary. My requests for 
documentation have been ignored. . . . 
I know there are XXXX other individuals facing similar issues with the 
PSLF program stationed in my area alone. For instance, if a servicemember 
 
85. 34 C.F.R. § 685.219(c)(1)(iii) (2019). This is a regulatory requirement, not a statutory one. 
The statute only requires that the borrower “has made 120 monthly payments” under a qualifying 
payment plan. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m)(1)(A). 
86. 34 C.F.R. § 685.219(c). 
87. CFPB REPORT, supra note 69, at 41. 
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pays just XXXX dollar more than what is owed, the payments don’t count 
and they tack months on the back end towards forgiveness.88 
Borrowers who make a payment after the fifteenth of the month will not get 
credit, whether the lateness was due to borrower negligence or servicer 
miscommunications. Numerous borrower complaints in the CFPB database 
concern borrowers’ inability to get timely instructions about payment amounts and 
due dates from their servicers, especially when changing servicers or  
repayment plans.  
2. The Employer Certification Issue 
A borrower must be employed full time by a public service employer, at the 
time each of the 120 payments are made, for the payments to count.89 For the first 
five years of the program, USED failed to provide any means by which borrowers 
or their servicers could determine whether an employer qualified. Beginning in 
January 2012, USED developed an employer certification form (ECF) that 
borrowers could submit periodically to verify that they met the “right employer” 
criteria for PSLF.90 After having an employer sign the form, the borrower submits 
it to their servicer, who transmits it to PHEAA/FedLoan.91 FedLoan then reviews 
it, checks a list of employers provided by USED, and in the case of nonprofit 
employers, escalates the approval decision to USED itself.92 Once the form is 
approved, FedLoan instructs the other servicer to transfer servicing to FedLoan and 
notifies the borrower.93 USED and PHEAA have not given borrowers clear 
instructions about how frequently ECFs should be submitted. 
USED has never created a comprehensive list of qualifying employers. 
PHEAA attempted to compile an employer database from approved ECFs, but 
USED faulted PHEAA’s process for vetting employers in the PHEAA database.94 
The USED regulation also requires PHEAA to exclude “organizations engaged in 
religious activities,” an exclusion not mentioned in the governing statute.95 This 
requires the servicer to do additional evaluation of employer certifications beyond 
checking for tax-exempt status. To further complicate the task, USED requires 
PHEAA to carefully match the employment start and end dates appearing on ECF 
 
88. 2081382, Complaint on Consumer Complaint Database, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU 
(Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/consumer-complaints/search/
detail/2081382 [https://perma.cc/Z6Q5-Z2DJ].  
89. 34 C.F.R. § 685.219(c)(2). 
90. Am. Bar Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 370 F. Supp. 3d 1, 12–13 (D.D.C. 2019). 
91. See FED. STUDENT AID OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN 




94. COMM. ON EDUC. & LAB., BROKEN PROMISES: HOW THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 
FAILED AMERICA’S PUBLIC SERVANTS, at exhibit 1 (2019) (Oct. 25, 2016 audit report by USED). 
95. 34 C.F.R. § 685.219(b) (2019); cf. 20 U.S.C. §1087e(m)(3)(B). The regulation, but not the 
statute, also excludes labor unions and partisan political organizations. 
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forms to qualifying payments, month by month.96 Any payment that falls outside 
the start and end dates on an ECF does not count.97 
According to the CFPB report, “borrowers complained that servicers may be 
slow to provide them with accurate guidance” regarding their ECFs, with servicers 
taking months to respond to questions.98 Borrowers also complained of their ECFs 
being denied and servicers not providing sufficient information to understand the 
reason for their denial.99 One CFPB complaint relates the following: 
My servicer, FedLoan/PHEAA, is alleging that dozens of my Public 
Service Loan Forgiveness payments do not qualify toward my 120 
qualifying payments. I have worked for XXXX and I have submitted forms 
each year according to the instructions on the form. The form clearly stated 
at one point that if an employee is still at her current job she should write 
“today’s date’’ on the form. It now has a box that users can check that says 
“still employed.’’ I filled out my forms each year according to the 
instructions, either putting “today’s date’’ or checking the box, and now 
my servicer is not counting each certification as if I [was] employed at that 
employer. Rather, they are using the “current’’ date as my “end’’ date.  
After filing annual employer certifications for five years, it is astounding 
to me that my servicer, FedLoan, has been miscounting my certifications 
all along. Nobody notified me about any of five forms I submitted. I only 
found all of this out when I had a separate problem with FedLoan. They 
are now saying that I must go back to my previous employers to have them 
re-certify my employment.  
After calling FedLoan, they instructed me to only submit forms when I 
leave employers, rather than submit forms each year. Now I don’t know 
which advice to follow—to submit annual employer certifications or just 
wait until I think my 120 payments is up. What is the point of trying to stay 
current with my PSLF certifications if I am just going to have to go back 
and do this all over again?100 
Similarly, the plaintiff in Love v. PHEAA, a Georgia class action, asserts that 
she worked for ten years for a district attorneys’ association and various public 
defender offices, had her ECF approved in 2012, only to be told by FedLoan in 




98. CFPB REPORT, supra note 69, at 37. 
99. Id.; see also Am. Bar Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 370 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2019) (finding 
that USED arbitrarily reversed its approval of the American Bar Association as a public service 
employer, to the detriment of several borrowers whose prior ECFs had been approved). 
100. 1933448, Complaint on Consumer Complaint Database, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU 
(May 19, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/consumer-complaints/search/
detail/1933448 [https://perma.cc/JG86-PUMU]. 
101. Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial ¶¶ 38–64, Love v. Pa. Higher  
Educ. Assistance Agency, No. 1:19-cv-02387-MHC (N.D. Ga. Apr. 12, 2019). 
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point to determine whether and to what extent employer certifications are 
erroneously rejected. 
If a borrower did not submit ECFs each year during all ten years, they must 
go back and obtain written verification of qualifying employment for the entire 
repayment period or for any missing periods when they apply for loan forgiveness 
at the end of the ten years. It is likely that some denials based on “qualifying 
payments” are attributable to PHEAA determinations not to count periods of 
employment for which it disapproved one or more ECFs.  
3. Administrative Forbearance, Servicing Transfers, and Lost Payments 
Borrowers frequently report that servicers are not keeping accurate records of 
fully qualifying payments. As one borrower wrote, her loan servicer “has 
miscalculated my qualifying payments over the last two years, initially telling me I 
had only made 8 qualifying payments, then 21, then that they had to ‘further review’ 
my account after I had complained a number of times, indicating that I had, in fact, 
made closer to 60.”102 When the same borrower followed up to check the status of 
her payment calculation, she was told it could take up to a year for the servicer to 
get back to her.103 
The CFPB report includes a variety of examples of servicer and borrower 
errors leading to incorrect qualifying payment counts. Borrowers complained that 
once they submit their ECF, the “servicer gives inaccurate counts of qualified 
payments made by borrowers,” and when they seek correction borrowers struggle 
to have their servicer correct the error or give reasons for why they provided the 
number that they did.104 Borrowers also complained that when servicers fail to 
process a borrower’s income-based repayment (IBR) annual recertification on time, 
they remove borrower’s loans from IBR, which delays qualifying payments, 
increases monthly payments, and allows the loan to accrue more interest.105 One 
CFPB complaint illustrates how a simple borrower error in recertifying IBR each 
year can disqualify the borrower’s payments: 
I am currently repaying under the income driven repayment plan. My 
repayment is under the Income Based Repayment (IBR) and I am seeking 
the Public Service Loan Forgiveness as I currently work for a qualifying 
XXXX. My loan servicer is FedLoan. My IBR requires me to certify my 
 
102. Cory Turner, ‘I Am Heartbroken’: Your Letters About Public Service Loan Forgiveness, NPR 
(Oct. 18, 2018, 4:19 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/18/658447443/i-am-heartbroken-your-
letters-about-public-service-loan-forgiveness [https://perma.cc/5D3Z-Q58R]. 
103. Id. Another borrower writes in an email: “When I first asked for a review of how many 
qualifying payments I’d made well over 6 or 7 years into my public service career, I was told the number 
was only 17 lol (so 1yr 5mos of payments). Incredulous, I called up, and a lady explained they’d 
misapplied a payment a while back and so subsequent payments hadn’t counted in their initial review. 
She assured me they’d recalculate soon. That was seriously probably two years ago. I’ve called a few 
times and just get told it takes a while.” Id. 
104. CFPB REPORT, supra note 69, at 39. 
105. Id. at 39–40. 
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income yearly using my adjusted gross income (AGI) from my federal tax 
return. This year (XXXX) I was shocked to discover that my monthly 
payment jumped from {$140.00} per month in XX/XX/XXXX to 
{$1000.00} in XX/XX/XXXX. It is not even the XXXX XXXX, which 
I assumed I would have until at least that date to certify my income since 
that is the date taxes are due. Well I was wrong. My current IBR is still valid 
until XX/XX/XXXX, however there is some requirement that is hidden 
in some fine print somewhere that requires me to certify my income 90 
days before my current IBR expired. As a result, all of my qualifying 
payments made toward my public service loan forgiveness have been 
wiped out, {$5000.00} of accrued interest that was not being added to my 
balance due to my IBR plan immediately got added on taking my balance 
from {$97000.00} to over {$100000.00}, and there is no willingness of 
FedLoan to reverse any of this in light of the fact that I immediately 
submitted my income certification and they received the request prior to 
my payment due date and well prior to the actual expiration of my prior 
year IBR plan. This is absolutely depressing. All progress I made toward 
paying my loans on time and working toward the Public Service Loan 
Forgiveness is gone, my balance is even higher, and there just seems to be 
no end in sight. . . . I looked back and it appears I received XXXX notice 
giving me until XX/XX/XX to certify my income which came to my 
parent’s house (listed as my permanent address since I enrolled in college 
in XX/XX/XXXX). I had not even received all of my tax info by then 
and XXXX is before the date taxes are even due to the IRS.106 
Borrower payments are also disqualified because of servicers’ misuse of 
forbearance. Forbearance is an account status that does not require the borrower to 
make any payment but during which interest continues to accrue. This practice is 
described in the Winebarger v. PHEAA class action complaint107 and in the 
American Federation of Teachers (AFT) class action against Navient.108 The AFT 
suit alleges that Navient misdirected borrowers eligible for income-based repayment 
into forbearance instead.109 The Winebarger suit, as well as enforcement actions 
brought by various state attorneys general, assert that PHEAA puts borrowers into 
forbearance while it processes the servicing transfer of a PSLF applicant’s account, 
while it recertifies an income-based payment plan, or while researching borrower 
disputes.110 During those months, payments the borrower makes are not counted, 
because technically no payments are due.  
 
106. 1873846, Complaint on Consumer Complaint Database, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU 
(Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/consumer-complaints/search/
detail/1873846 [https://perma.cc/4GFL-JWP7]. 
107. Class Action Complaint, Winebarger v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency,  
No. 2:19-cv-01503 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2019). 
108. Class Action Complaint, Hyland v. Navient Corp., No. 1:18-cv-09031 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2018). 
109. Id. 
110. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 107, at 22–24. 
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The CFPB sued one servicer, Navient, alleging that it systematically abused 
administrative forbearance in order to maximize servicing fees, when borrowers 
would have been better off in income-based repayment.111 The class action 
complaint filed by American Federation of Teachers members also cites several 
instances of borrowers being told that income-based repayment was not available 
and that their best option would be forbearance status.112  
4. Ineligible Payment Plans (Subject of the TEPSLF Fix) 
 Borrowers who made payments under graduated or extended payment plans 
will not have payments made under those plans counted for PSLF. According to 
the CFPB report, borrowers complain of servicers enrolling them into 
nonqualifying repayment plans, despite expressing interest in PSLF.113 Borrowers 
also reported telling their servicer that they work in public service, but their servicers 
never informed them about PSLF or the repayment plan requirements for PSLF.114 
Rather than enrolling them into the requisite repayment plan for PSLF, servicers 
would enroll them into nonqualifying plans.115 Other borrowers reported servicers 
incorrectly denying their applications for a qualifying income-driven repayment 
(IDR) plan or the servicer not accepting their applications.116 Also, borrowers who 
return to school with outstanding student loans complain of servicers preventing 
them from remaining in qualified repayment plans.117  
5. Waiting Too Long to Consolidate FFEL into Direct Loans 
At inception, only a minority of borrowers were eligible for the PSLF program. 
The first borrower cohorts eligible for PSLF, those entering repayment in 2007 and 
2008, mostly took out FFEL guaranteed student loans, which are ineligible for 
PSLF.118 Only about twenty percent of federal student loans in those years were 
Direct Loans eligible for PSLF.119 The majority of borrowers from those years had 
to use Federal Direct Consolidation Loans to convert ineligible FFEL loans to 
eligible Direct Loans to participate in PSLF.120 Ineligible FFEL loans were phased 
 
111. CFPB Sues Nation’s Largest Student Loan Company Navient for Failing Borrowers at Every 
Stage of Repayment, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU ( Jan. 18, 2017), https://
www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-sues-nations-largest-student-loan-company-
navient-failing-borrowers-every-stage-repayment/ [https://perma.cc/R2ZA-BGEL]. 
112. Class Action Complaint, supra note 107, ¶ 67. 
113. CFPB REPORT, supra note 69, at 33.  
114. Id. at 37. 
115. See id. at 38. 
116. Id. at 33. 
117. Id. at 34–35. 
118. See DEP’T OF EDUC., STUDENT LOANS OVERVIEW: FISCAL YEAR 2011 BUDGET 
REQUEST, at T-13 to T-22 (2011), https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget11/
justifications/t-loansoverview.pdf [https://perma.cc/T47G-ZMA2].  
119. See id. at T-13 to T-14.  
120. See id. 
First to Printer_White_SNCE Edits.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/27/20  9:52 AM 
274 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:255 
out by 2010.121 From that year onwards, the only student loans ineligible for PSLF 
were Perkins loans and private loans.122 The first borrowers to apply for PSLF in 
2017 and 2018 report being confused or misinformed about the need to convert 
FFEL loans to Direct Loans before payments would begin counting towards the 
120 for PSLF.123 An unknown number of denials for shortfalls in qualifying 
payments result from borrowers having made payments on FFEL loans prior to 
Direct Loan consolidation.124 Moreover, each time a borrower consolidates prior 
loans, payments made before the latest consolidation do not count towards PSLF.125 
According to the CFPB, borrowers reported spending years making payments, 
“believing they were making progress towards PSLF, before servicers explain that 
their loans do not qualify for PSLF.”126 One consumer complaint in the CFPB 
database is typical: 
I worked full time for a qualifying public service organization from XX/
XX/XXXX- XX/XX/XXXX. Fedloans Servicing refuses to honor 
payments made during this time for Public Service Forgiveness because I 
consolidated a XX/XX/XXXX XXXX along my previous consolidation 
done previously when XXXX serviced my loans. XXXX did not tell me 
that this would put my future . . . in jeopardy. I realize that this is not your 
problem, but this is what happened to me. Now, I am being made to pay 
for a mistake made by XXXX. They even denied counting my time to the 
Ombudsman.  
Representatives from FedLoan Servicing told me is that a new 
consolidation was created when I consolidated my new loan taken in XX/
XX/XXXX with my existing consolidated loans (XXXX was servicing the 
loans at the time). As a result, they will not count any of my payments time 
that I worked for a public service organization from XXXX (my loans were 
consolidated at that time). I let them know that I was not told by XXXX 
that this would jeopardize my public service loan forgiveness. I remember 
telling the XXXX customer service representative that I needed to 
consolidate my XX/XX/XXXX loan with my existing consolidation so 
that I could get credit for my time worked for a XXXX from XXXX. So, 
I proceeded with the consolidation paperwork not realizing that I would 
be in this situation. I am not trying to get out of paying. I just would like 
the time to count as I am working for a XXXX.127 
Borrowers also reported delays and defects in the process of consolidating 
their FFEL loans into a Direct Consolidation Loan, which they must do to qualify 
 
121. Id. at T-15. 
122. Id.  
123. See CFPB REPORT, supra note 69, at 32–33. 
124. Id. at 29–30. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 29. 
127. 1832127, Complaint on Consumer Complaint Database, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU 
(Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/consumer-complaints/search/
detail/1832127 [https://perma.cc/E7M3-8G6F]. 
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for PSLF.128 This process should only take thirty days, but borrowers report 
processing taking upwards of six months due to the original servicer not providing 
the requisite information to their future servicer, or a number of servicing errors in 
which a servicer leaves necessary loans out of the consolidation process.129 These 
borrowers are understandably frustrated that payments they made before Direct 
Loan Consolidation do not qualify for PSLF credit. 
PSLF denials based on insufficient qualifying payments thus result from 
multiple causes. While it is possible that some borrowers simply miscounted and 
applied prematurely, borrower miscalculation seems an unlikely explanation for all 
55,000 PSLF applications rejected based on insufficient payments. Our own survey 
of CUNY Law graduates found that forty-five of sixty-nine respondents intend to 
apply for PSLF, and nearly half (twenty-one out of forty-five) reported problems 
with their servicers, mostly involving proper counting of payments.130 Servicer and 
servicing transfer errors are clearly a major factor. An unknown number of denials 
appear to result from overly rigid payment timing rules, servicer delays in 
consolidating ineligible loans and recertifying income-dependent payment plays, 
misinformation given to borrowers about eligible loans and payment plans, and 
perhaps erroneous rejections of employer certifications. 
D. Denials Based on Missing Information 
Twenty-four percent of rejected PSLF applications were rejected on grounds 
that the applicant had not entered all necessary information in their application.131 
The data report defines this reason for rejection as follows: 
The application for forgiveness submitted was incomplete or didn’t have 
all the required information necessary to process the application. In this 
case the borrower is notified of what information is missing and requested 
to submit the missing information. Once the required information is 
resubmitted, the application is reviewed again to determine if the borrower 
now qualifies for forgiveness.132  
Because the servicer should have records of the amount and timing of all 
borrower payments, the repayment plan in effect and the type of loan, the only 
information needed from the borrower would logically be whether their employer(s) 
qualified as public service and whether the borrower was employed full time. It is 
also possible that form design causes some borrowers to omit required responses. 
Borrowers who submitted ECFs every year should not have this problem, but 
the ECF procedure is optional and voluntary. A borrower who did not submit 
 
128. CFPB REPORT, supra note 69, at 31. 
129. Id. at 32. 
130. Survey of CUNY law graduates by Alan White, Professor, City Univ. of N.Y. L. Sch. (2019) 
(on file with author). For example, one graduate wrote: “It’s been a year, and FedLoan will not certify 
over 30 payments I made at a particular employer (while my servicer was Navient).” Id. 
131. JUNE DATA REPORT, supra note 55, ¶ 14. 
132. Id. 
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annual ECFs for ten years must go back and reconstruct employment histories, and 
those cases are the likely cause of this rejection category. This issue is closely related 
to the servicer’s difficulties (described above) in matching ECFs with payment 
dates, resulting in payments not counting. 
E. Denials Based on No Eligible Loans 
Fifteen percent of rejected PSLF applications were rejected on grounds that 
the applicant did not have any eligible loans.133 The data report defines this reason 
for rejection as follows: 
The borrower has requested forgiveness but the borrower does not have 
Direct Loans that are eligible to participate in the PSLF program. Typically 
these borrowers have FFEL [Federal Family Education Loans], Perkins or 
private/non-federal loans. The borrower is informed they do not have 
loans eligible for PSLF and informed that FFEL or Perkins loans could be 
consolidated into DL, BUT they would then need to make 120 qualifying 
payments on the new consolidation loan (no previous payments on the 
FFEL or Perkins loans would count).134 
These cases are similar to “insufficient payments” cases where the borrower 
consolidated FFEL or Perkins loans into eligible Direct Loans during the ten-year 
period before applying, not realizing that pre-consolidation payments would not 
count towards the required 120. In these worst-case scenarios, borrowers have paid 
for the full ten years without realizing they could have converted ineligible loans to 
eligible loans.135 Borrowers have reported being rejected for this reason on Twitter. 
As @joeagresti writes: “I was misled by my servicers . . . TWICE. I have already 
made more than 120 on time payments and there is no end in sight as I found out 
I am still in the wrong ‘type’ of loan.”136 Borrowers complained of servicers failing 
to advise them that their loans were not eligible for PSLF, despite knowing that 
borrowers were in public service jobs or are actively pursuing PSLF.137 Borrowers 
then make years of payments that do not count towards the PSLF.138  
F. Denials Based on Employment Dates 
Two percent of rejected PSLF applications were rejected on grounds that a 
part of their employment in public service took place prior to the PSLF program 
start date or prior to the disbursement of their loans.139 The data report defines this 




135. See CFPB REPORT, supra note 69, at 29. 
136. Joe Agresti (@joeagresti), TWITTER (Apr. 29, 2019, 7:55 AM), https://www.twitter.com/
NCFFjoe/status/1122876963985743874 [https://perma.cc/AN98-FCZY].  
137. CFPB REPORT, supra note 69, at 29–30. 
138. Id. 
139. JUNE DATA REPORT, supra note 55, ¶ 14. 
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The borrower submitted an application and the underlying employment 
dates do not qualify for forgiveness due to employment dates prior to the 
PSLF program start date (October 1, 2007) or employment dates prior to 
the disbursement dates on the loans requested for discharge. The borrower 
is informed that the application is denied and the employment dates do not 
meet the program requirements for discharge.140  
These borrowers should be able to reapply after making additional qualifying 
payments, and this category should soon disappear with the passage of time. 
G. Denials Based on Ineligible Employer 
Two percent of rejected PSLF applications were rejected on grounds that their 
(presumably current) employer was not eligible under the requirements of the 
PSLF.141 The data report defines this reason for rejection as follows: 
The borrower submitted an application that is requesting forgiveness based 
on an employer that has been deemed ineligible for the PSLF program. 
The borrower is informed their employer is not a qualified employer.142 
There has been some litigation around the definition of an eligible 
employer.143 The simplest cases are tax-exempt 501(c)(3) organizations and 
government employers, but “public service” is defined a bit more broadly in the 
statute and regulation. The statute and regulation include job types as well as 
employer types, such as health-care professionals, so that some employer 
certifications do require judgment on the part of the servicer or USED. Borrowers 
with these gray area qualifying job cases should have some due process means to 
appeal adverse decisions. While obviously important for borrowers with a legitimate 
dispute about meeting the public service definition, this category accounts for a 
relatively small part of the overall PSLF failure.  
Payment counting and matching and employer certification paperwork thus 
account for the largest denial categories. Borrowers are denied cancellation because 
they made their payments too soon or too late in the month, because the start and 
end dates on their employer certifications don’t precisely match up, because boxes 
are not checked, and for various other bureaucratic reasons. Other borrowers have 
made payments on the wrong loans, or in the wrong payment plans, or were in 
forbearance because their servicers misinformed them. Virtually all of the denials 
appear to be potential false negatives—deserving applicants victimized by servicer 
incompetence or agency indifference. 
 
140. Id. (“Definitions” tab of the spreadsheet). 
141. Id. ¶ 14. 
142. Id. (“Definitions” tab of the spreadsheet). 
143. See Am. Bar Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 370 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2019). 
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IV. FAILURE OF THE CONTRACT STATE TO RECONCILE PUBLIC GOALS  
The public student loan program’s goals are multiple yet clear: (1) to require 
students to bear a major part of the cost of higher education, but based on ability 
to pay; (2) to maximize recovery of loan administration costs and loan losses; (3) to 
minimize defaults by aligning loan payments with borrower incomes; and, 
importantly, (4) to cancel debts for graduates and noncompleters based on 
individual need (e.g., disability) or to reward desirable employment choices (public 
service). The achievement or failure of each of these legislative goals is  
readily measurable.  
Whether administered by public employees or private contractors, the 
difficulty in translating legislative desires to lived experience of borrowers is to 
create organizational culture that values each of the goals and rewards individual 
and group success in promoting the goals. While the ability and motivation of 
government bureaucrats to achieve legislative goals has been challenged by public 
choice theorists,144 the neoliberal solution of contracting out state functions doubles 
the difficulty. Instead of requiring an effective organizational culture in a single 
bureaucracy, contracting out requires both an effective organizational culture and 
the agency’s ability to construct and oversee contractual terms and relationships that 
result in private contractors adopting and promoting a similar culture. The 
fundamental problem with the contract state is this second layer of institutional 
design. Moreover, private contractors in the state-capitalist economy begin with a 
default culture of maximizing profits or at least maximizing economic outputs while 
minimizing costs. Agencies thus face the daunting task of translating multiple public 
goals into cost and output measures. The experience of the Education Department’s 
loan servicing contracts is telling. 
As Fink and Zullo have pointed out, the actual servicing contracts with 
PHEAA and other servicers pay the servicers by loan volume and reward them for 
minimizing staff time spent working with borrowers.145 The paltry five dollar 
payment for administering a complete PSLF loan cancellation similarly fails to 
translate the legislative goal into contractor performance. The agency disdain for 
legislative goals other than maximizing repayments and minimizing costs reflects an 
organizational culture at the bureaucratic level that stands as an obstacle to full 
achievement of public policy. But even if we imagine an agency culture more aligned 
with congressional debt relief policy goals, the contracting-out model raises serious 
obstacles to translating legislative objectives into reality. Even an agency whose 
contracts included substantial financial rewards for contractors to identify and 
cancel debts of eligible borrowers would face the challenge of contractor culture 
that inevitably seeks to minimize costs. 
 
144. See generally PATRICK DUNLEAVY, DEMOCRACY, BUREAUCRACY AND PUBLIC  
CHOICE: ECONOMIC EXPLANATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (Routledge ed., 1st ed. 1991). 
145. Fink & Zullo, supra note 11. 
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The experience of the Treasury’s attempts to contract with mortgage loan 
servicers to achieve home mortgage loan relief during the foreclosure crisis is 
instructive. The Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) offered 
mortgage servicers Treasury payments of up to $5,000 per loan for successfully 
restructuring homeowner mortgages to prevent foreclosures.146 Even the 
significant HAMP payments were only partly successful in motivating mortgage 
servicers, the largest of which were major banks whose culture valued repayment 
over debt relief.147 Only one or two “specialty” servicers attempted a business 
strategy of maximizing HAMP loan modifications to maximize revenue from the 
Treasury payments.148 The inertial pull of bank culture continually promoted 
payment collection over aid to borrowers, even with a federal agency (somewhat) 
committed to preventing foreclosures and renegotiating loans. In the loan servicing 
context, the contract state model may be deeply incompatible with debt relief. 
The PSLF program failure is also a case illustrating the oligopolistic power of 
a government contractor that has extensive program knowledge, experience, and 
revolving-door access to the contracting agency. As USED became more dependent 
on a few large servicers, like PHEAA, to run its mammoth loan program, its ability 
to shop competitively for other contractors became largely illusory, especially as 
personnel moved back and forth between contractor and oversight agency. PHEAA 
reportedly relied on extensive political ties to USED to avoid losing its contract or 
being sanctioned for poor performance.149 
The Education Department’s financial aid unit, which hires loan servicers 
like PHEAA to manage the payments of the roughly 45 million Americans 
who owe federal student loans, has long been a place where officials move 
between private industry and government. For instance, Mark LaVia, the 
career department official who oversees PHEAA and other student loan 
servicing companies, was a longtime PHEAA employee before he was 
hired during the Obama administration.150 
 
146. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM 
GUIDELINES 12 (2009), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/
modification_program_guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8FF-TVZP].  
147. See SHEILA BAIR, BULL BY THE HORNS: FIGHTING TO SAVE MAIN STREET FROM WALL 
STREET AND WALL STREET FROM ITSELF 151–52 (Free Press ed., 1st ed. 2012); CONG. OVERSIGHT 
PANEL, 111TH CONG., A REVIEW OF TREASURY’S FORECLOSURE PREVENTION PROGRAMS (2010), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-111JPRT62622/html/CPRT-111JPRT62622.htm 
[https://perma.cc/UJ3N-YV46]. 
148. See Fitch: U.S. Mortgage Loan Mods Double for Ocwen Post-Streamline HAMP, REUTERS 
(Sept. 15, 2016, 8:36 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSFit973331 [https://perma.cc/
685M-8CN5] (describing specialty mortgage servicer Ocwen Loan Servicing’s projection that HAMP 
modifications will be cost-effective). 
149. Michael Stratford, Student Loan Behemoth Tightens Its Ties to Trump and DeVos, POLITICO 
(Sept. 9, 2019, 5:03 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/09/09/student-loans-donald-trump-
betsy-devos-1712812 [https://perma.cc/HG4E-W7LW]. 
150. Id. 
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The contract state thus not only faces serious obstacles to implementing plural 
policy objectives, but also may fail to achieve purported competitive efficiencies 
when the relationship between agency and contractor becomes too cozy. 
V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Even if future administrations adopt sweeping student loan cancellation and 
fund all higher education through public appropriations, the administrative 
challenge of carrying out the debt cancellation will remain. In the more likely event 
that Congress adopts something short of universal and immediate student loan 
forgiveness,151 the PSLF experience teaches us that the contract state is unlikely to 
deliver fully on the legislative promise. One solution, advocated by Fink and Zullo, 
would be to abandon the contract state model and instead to transfer student loan 
servicing to a public agency.152 They suggest the IRS or the U.S. Postal Service, 
among others.153 If Congress fails to adopt a public option for loan servicing, the 
solutions will inevitably be more complex, although an effective loan cancellation 
program administered by the contract state is by no means unimaginable.  
Remedies for the PSLF failure to date should be both retrospective and 
prospective. There should be a comprehensive audit of applications rejected to date 
to discover the obstacles to PSLF approvals, and to identify categories of errors and 
unduly strict review processes. Borrowers from the pre-2017 cohorts should have 
their forgiveness applications reviewed for servicing delays and errors, and be given 
credit for resulting payments made under the wrong plan or wrong loan. USED 
should apply flexible approaches to certify past employment for periods when 
annual certification forms were unavailable. Prospectively, PSLF can be simplified 
and properly implemented with a series of contractual, regulatory, and legislative 
fixes. In particular, the unduly strict and difficult to administer on-time payment 
rule should be relaxed; all payment plans and federal loan types should be eligible; 
employer certification should be automated using IRS employer information and a 
database of qualifying employers; applicants should have access to an effective 
appeal process; and USED should adequately compensate and incentivize its 
servicer for administering PSLF. 
 
151. For example, presidential candidate Elizabeth Warren’s detailed student loan cancellation 
proposal sets income limits and other eligibility rules that would have to be administratively 
implemented, even if some income and debt information could be automatically retrieved from IRS 
filings and the National Student Loan Database. See Affordable Higher Education For All, WARREN 
DEMOCRATS, https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/affordable-higher-education/ [https://perma.cc/
GHR9-ENW5] ( last visited Feb. 5, 2020); see also Michael Lux, Expert Review of the Pete Buttigieg 
Student Plan, STUDENT LOAN SHERPA (Nov. 22, 2019), https://studentloansherpa.com/review-
buttigieg-plan/ [https://perma.cc/352F-JK4Z] (describing candidate Pete Buttigieg’s plan to improve 
PSLF by forgiving some debt before the ten-year period ends). 
152. Fink & Zullo, supra note 11, at 13–14. 
153. Id. 
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A. Contract Oversight and Enforcement 
Many of the causes of PSLF failure result from the failure of servicers to 
properly perform their contracts with USED. PHEAA/FedLoan has contracts to 
exclusively service all student loans for borrowers seeking a PSLF discharge. Once 
a borrower submits an Employer Certification Form and it is approved by the 
servicer, servicing of the borrower’s eligible loans is transferred from the current 
servicer to PHEAA/FedLoan (if FedLoan is not already the borrower’s servicer).154  
Specific servicer errors identified in borrower complaints that contribute to 
PSLF program failure include the following: 
1) Misusing administrative forbearance for PSLF participants caused by 
delays in certifying or recertifying income-based repayment or 
misinforming borrowers of their payment options. 
2) Inaccurate payment records, especially after servicing transfers. 
3) Failing to promptly process employer certification forms and treat all 
ECF submitters as PSLF prospects. 
4) Delaying Direct Consolidation Loans for months. 
5) Not training personnel to correctly inform borrowers of PSLF eligibility 
rules and of borrowers’ status in the PSLF program, so that borrowers 
remained in the wrong payment plan or wrong loan after certifying a public 
service job.155 
USED should use all available contract enforcement tools to correct servicer 
contract breaches. USED should require audits of all or a large sample of rejected 
PSLF applications, should require PHEAA to reprocess those reflecting servicer 
errors, and should establish an administrative review or appeal process for rejected 
PSLF applicants. USED should require non-PHEAA servicers to audit accounts 
for which ECFs were submitted to identify those that were not promptly advised 
to enter an eligible payment plan, consolidate ineligible loans if necessary, and 
transfer the loans to PHEAA for servicing. In those cases, servicers should be 
required to compensate borrowers for delay in qualifying for loan forgiveness. 
Borrowers misled by servicers into making nonqualifying payments should have 
those payments counted as qualifying or be compensated for the delayed 
forgiveness, either as an administrative or court-ordered remedy. 
USED’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued a critical audit report on 
FSA’s oversight of servicers on February 12, 2019.156 Like the CFPB report, the 
OIG report documents how servicers failed to tell borrowers about repayment 
options and miscalculated borrower payments in IDRs, in violation of servicing 
contracts. The audit found that (1) FSA had failed to establish policies and 
 
154. See FED. STUDENT AID OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN 
FORGIVENESS PROGRAM 3–4 (2014), https://studentaid.gov/sites/default/files/public-service-loan-
forgiveness-employment-certification-borrower-letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/RUE6-CX6R]. 
155. See supra notes 79–120 and accompanying text. 
156. OIG REPORT, supra note 68, at 2.  
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procedures that provided reasonable assurance that the risk of servicer 
noncompliance with requirements for servicing federally held student loans were 
mitigated; (2) “FSA’s oversight activities regularly identified instances of servicers’ 
not servicing federally held student loans in accordance with Federal requirements,” 
and FSA failed to produce an analysis adequate to identify recurring trends and 
instances of servicer noncompliance; (3) “FSA management rarely used available 
contract accountability provisions to hold servicers accountable for 
noncompliance,” and failed to “incorporate a performance metric relevant to 
servicer compliance . . . into its methodology for assigning loans to servicers”; and 
(4) “FSA employees did not always follow policy when evaluating the quality of 
servicer representatives’ interactions with borrowers, and FSA” failed to provide 
OIG with reports of failed calls to servicers.157 
In the OIG report, the office recommends that the FSA CEO “track all 
instances of noncompliance identified during FSA oversight activities, . . . and use 
records to identify trends and recurring noncompliance for each servicer and across 
all servicers; use the contractual accountability provisions available . . . to hold 
servicers accountable for noncompliance,” “such as requiring the return of funds 
or reducing future loan volume”; and “regularly share the results of any FSA loan 
servicing oversight activities with servicers.”158 
USED knew by 2016 that hundreds of thousands of student loan borrowers 
planning to apply for PSLF were headed for rejection as they started applying in late 
2017.159 The Department concluded its own review of PHEAA’s administration of 
PSLF on October 25, 2016, about a year before the first cohort of borrowers would 
become eligible for loan cancellation.160 At the time of the review, 449,860 
borrowers were designated as PSLF participants, presumably because they had at 
least one approved public service employer certification form. The reviewers 
audited a sample of thirty-four borrower loan files and found that fifty-three 
percent had ZERO qualifying payments. Of those, about forty percent were in a 
nonqualifying payment plan and sixty percent had ECFs with employment periods 
ending more than one year prior to the review date, in other words, no current 
evidence of qualifying employment.161 Given that all of these borrowers submitted 
at least one ECF, it is reasonable to assume that most, if not all of them, were 
unaware that they were making no progress towards the required ten years  
of repayment. 
Instead of faulting PHEAA for a situation in which half of borrowers were in 
danger of not getting PSLF credit for their payments, USED delved into the 
minutiae of PSLF payment counting and found two instances of payment-counting 
errors resulting from servicing transfers. In their recommendations, the USED 
 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 3. 
159. Id. at 4. 
160. COMM. ON EDUC. & LAB., supra note 94. 
161. Id. 
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reviewers stress “it is imperative that Fedloan Servicing and FSA partner to ensure 
only those truly eligible for forgiveness receive this benefit.”162 No mention is made 
of any need to get in touch with the fifty percent of borrowers who are in the wrong 
payment plan or do not have up-to-date employer certifications.163 In other words, 
USED’s audit reflected its primary concern with avoiding false positives and a 
complete lack of concern for false negatives. 
USED has failed to oversee and enforce its PSLF contract with PHEAA. This 
may be due to an agency culture that views the mission as maximizing student loan 
collections and does not value delivery of loan cancellation or payment relief. It may 
be due to the inherent conflict between those two missions. It may be due to 
inadequate agency resources devoted to making PSLF a reality for millions of 
potentially eligible former students. Regardless of the cause, USED must 
dramatically improve its contract oversight and enforcement for PSLF to function 
as Congress intended. 
B. Contract Design 
USED’s ten-year servicing contracts were due to expire at the end of 2019. 
These contracts should not be renewed for another ten years without addressing 
the failure of the PSLF program. While USED could make better use of existing 
contract enforcement tools, the contract incentives and performance metrics should 
be redesigned. The teachers’ union lawsuit describes in detail the disincentives 
servicers face under current contracts: any servicer other than PHEAA will lose the 
servicing income from any account once the borrower’s ECF form is approved and 
the account is transferred to PHEAA, thus discouraging servicers from telling 
borrowers about PSLF or helping them qualify.164 The suit also points out that 
administrative forbearance is lucrative for servicers because it is lower cost and 
allows interest to continue accruing.165  
USED does not pay PHEAA to help borrowers successfully navigate PSLF 
and obtain their discharge. Based on our review of publicly available contract 
documents, the only payments USED makes to PHEAA are five dollars for the 
first approved ECF submitted, and $2.50 for each disapproved ECF.166 According 
to the New York Attorney General’s complaint, 
[b]ecause FedLoan receives only the small flat fee to evaluate a borrower’s 
initial eligibility and determine the number of PSLF-qualifying payments at 
 
162. Id. at 7. 
163. COMM. ON EDUC. & LAB., supra note 94, at 3. The authors of the October 25, 2016 review 
(Debbe Johnson, Larry Porter, and Christian Lee Odom of SFA) note on the first page that it is for 
internal USED use only and is a policy deliberation document, presumably to shield it from FOIA 
release. It became public when the House Education and Labor Committee released the review as an 
exhibit to the committee’s October 2019 report on the PSLF fiasco. 
164. Amended Class Action Complaint ¶¶ 318–341, Hyland v. Navient Corp., No. 18-cv-9031 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2019). 
165. Id. 
166. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., SINGLE SERVICER CONTRACT, supra note 50. 
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that time, its incentive is to perform that task as quickly and cheaply as 
possible, regardless of quality of service.167 
Further, since FedLoan is paid only for the initial eligibility determination and 
payment count, when a borrower submits a subsequent ECF, as borrowers are 
encouraged to do annually by the Department of Education, it receives no 
additional compensation for updating the borrower’s payment count or for assisting 
borrowers with their ongoing participation in the program. FedLoan thus has an 
incentive to minimize the effort it expends updating payment counts every time a 
borrower files a new ECF.168 
USED must compensate the PSLF servicer adequately for the work required 
to review and approve borrower applications. Performance measures and related 
incentives and penalties should reward servicers for helping borrowers certify public 
service employment and ultimately qualify for PSLF.  
Contracts could also call for better technology to automate PSLF processes 
and facilitate borrower participation. For starters, borrowers should have an easy 
method to opt into the PSLF program when they first enter repayment. Initial 
communications to borrowers entering repayment should include a PSLF opt-in 
button and an employer certification form. Employers should be able to certify  
full-time employment and government or nonprofit status using a simple electronic 
form. Better yet, servicers should retrieve the borrower’s employer ID number from 
the IRS together with income information for income-based repayment, using the 
IRS data retrieval tool. USED and IRS should provide an online lookup for servicers 
to identify government and 501(c)(3) exempt employers. The servicer’s monthly 
billing statement should include a flag for any borrower who opted in to PSLF, 
should provide a running total of qualifying payments, and should explain whether 
the most recent payment counted and if not, why not. Borrowers should be able to 
check their PSLF payment progress online in real time.169 
C. Regulatory Fixes 
1. Qualifying Payments 
The on-time payment requirement is not in the statute; the law only requires 
that the borrower “has made 120 monthly payments.”170 USED could revise or 
eliminate its current within-fifteen-days regulatory criterion for qualifying payments. 
While there may be policy reasons to prevent borrowers from making a large  
 
167. Complaint, New York v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, No. 1:19-cv-09155 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2019). 
168. Id. 
169. USED announced in February 2020 that its NextGen servicing platform will, among other 
things, allow student loan borrowers to check their progress in making payments towards a PSLF 
discharge. Mark Brown, Keeping the Promise: New Tools for a Better-Than-Ever Aid Experience, 
HOMEROOM (Feb. 24, 2020), https://blog.ed.gov/2020/02/keeping-promise-new-tools-better-ever-
aid-experience/ [https://perma.cc/JY5Z-CYKN]. 
170. 20 U.S.C. §1087e(m)(3)(B). 
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lump-sum payment to obtain a discharge, a more flexible rule would capture many 
early or slightly late payments allowing borrowers to qualify sooner. For example, a 
borrower should qualify if the account is current, was in qualifying payment plans 
for a total of 120 months, and does not reflect any single payment greater than 270 
days late (the current definition of default). In addition, voluntary payments made 
during forbearance that are greater than or equal to the borrower’s payment in their 
previous qualifying plan should be counted as made under the previous plan. 
2. Eligible Employers 
The statute defines public service job broadly, to include government, military, 
nonprofit 501(c)(3) organizations, and various occupational categories, such as 
health-care practitioners, social workers, and public interest law services.171 The 
USED regulation defines the term “public service organization” in a manner 
essentially parallel to the statutory definition.172 There are about 5.6 million 
employers in the United States and about 1.5 million nonprofit organizations.173 
The USED regulation would be more effective and easier to administer if it referred, 
in addition to easily identifiable government and tax-exempt 501(c)(3) employers, 
to objectively identifiable Department of Labor occupational categories covered by 
the statute. On the other hand, Congress created some of the complexity as to the 
“right employer” criteria in its lengthy statutory definition, which may need to be 
simplified. Senators Gillibrand and Kaine’s proposed legislation would additionally 
require the USED to establish a database of qualifying federal and state employers 
to help some borrowers qualify automatically, which would streamline the 
certification process significantly.174 
D. Legislative Fixes 
Congress could make PSLF work better by addressing two problems: the 
restrictions on qualifying payments and the complicated definition of public service 
job. Borrower denials due to “wrong payment plan” or “wrong loan” could be 
readily avoided with simplifying legislation that would count all borrower payments 
under any repayment plan and would retroactively include payments made on FFEL 
 
171. Id. 
172. 34 C.F.R. § 685.219(c)(2) (2019). 
173. Facts & Data on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, SBE COUNCIL, https://
sbecouncil.org/about-us/facts-and-data/ [https://perma.cc/GP7G-WW3D] ( last visited May 22, 
2020); NCCS Team, The Nonprofit Sector in Brief, NAT’L CTR. FOR CHARITABLE STAT. ( June 18, 2020), 
https://nccs.urban.org/project/nonprofit-sector-brief [https://perma.cc/SQ6J-BMBJ] (reporting 
that there are 1.5 million nonprofit organizations). 
174. Press Release, Tim Kaine, U.S. Sen., Gillibrand, Kaine Lead Group of 13 Senators to 
Introduce New Legislation to Overhaul Flawed Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program, Ensure 
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and Perkins loans. Consolidation loans should not restart the payment clock; in 
other words, pre-consolidation payments should count as well. Congress also made 
PSLF more cumbersome to administer by defining a lengthy list of public service 
jobs.175 The statutory definition may reflect some important policy choices, such as 
including nurses in for-profit as well as nonprofit hospitals, but at a high cost in 
terms of ease of administration. A definition based solely on the identity of the 
employer, that USED can translate into a lookup table or database, would be more 
workable. It is thus not entirely unfair to assign some blame for the program’s failure 
to the congressional policy choices and program design. Nevertheless, the lived 
experience of thousands of student loan borrowers paints a bleak picture of 
bureaucratic and contractor failure. 
CONCLUSION 
The student debt crisis is only amplified by the failure of USED and its 
servicers to implement PSLF. The broad goals of the program, which appropriately 
reduce debt burdens for lower-paid essential military, government, and public 
service workers, represent a plausible compromise between complete student loan 
cancellation and an entirely student-funded system of higher education. The original 
concept was relatively simple, and the statute and regulation can be further 
simplified. PSLF success, however, must depend not only on better legislative and 
regulatory design, but an organizational culture at USED and its contractors that 
regards granting of loan discharges to qualified PSLF applicants as an important 
measure of success. It may be that the failure of PSLF is endemic to the  
contracting-out model adopted by USED and FSA, and that a true solution requires 
a public servicer or a dedicated servicer properly constituted and compensated to 
achieve the program’s goals. 
 
175. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m). 
